The Euclidean geometry of cardinal welfare functions by Ridenour, Tim & Senesi, Prasad
THE EUCLIDEAN GEOMETRY OF
CARDINAL WELFARE FUNCTIONS
TIM RIDENOUR AND PRASAD SENESI
Abstract. We exploit the standard inner product of Euclidean space to pro-
vide a new direction from which one can understand and analyze certain voting
methods. Using this perspective along with the action of the symmetric and
special orthogonal groups on the vector space of profiles, we extend some nat-
ural voting criteria to ballots of arbitrary composition type.
1. Introduction
The mathematical foundations of voting theory date back to the late 18th cen-
tury, when Jean-Charles Borda introduced the Borda Count Method, and the Mar-
quis de Condorcet wrote about his now well-known paradox. This discipline saw
steady development leading to Kenneth Arrow’s 1950 impossibility theorem [1] for
which he was later awarded a Nobel prize. Subsequent decades saw further con-
tributions to social choice theory, using a greater variety of mathematical tools of
increasing sophistication, including - but not limited to - probability theory, ge-
ometry, topology, and algebra. In the 1990’s, Donald Saari, a mathematician and
economist at UC Irvine, began to use geometric methods to investigate the struc-
ture of voting systems and to understand and generate paradoxes of voting theory.
Among his many effective approaches, one was the representation of profiles (collec-
tions of ballots) as elements of a vector space. More recently, Michael Orrison and
his colleagues at Harvey Mudd College have recast some of Saari’s geometric meth-
ods in an algebraic framework ([4], [3]) and employed the action and representation
theory of the symmetric group on vector spaces of profiles.
Here, we rely heavily - and build - upon the framework introduced by Saari
and Orrison in [7] and [4]. In particular, a significant portion of the vector space
formalism we describe here is either explicitly or implicitly found in [4]. Foremost,
we are concerned not only with fully-ranked ballots of candidates, but with a vector
space of ‘partially ranked’ ballots of arbitrary composition type λ = (λ1, . . . , λm),
where λi > 0 and
∑
λi = |C| (where C is the collection of all candidates). These are
ballots for which there are λ1 first–place candidates, λ2 second–place candidates,
and so on. Some practical applications for such partially ranked ballots can be
found in [15].
The well-known family of positional voting methods plays a central role here;
indeed, we prove that all neutral linear cardinal welfare functions are of this form
- and repeatedly utilize this fact. At the same time, the most obvious limitation of
our scope is that, for most of our results, we are restricted to these linear functions.
Previous important contributions to social choice theory, from K. Arrow ([1],[2]),
A. Sen ([10],[11]), and K. Suzumura ([13],[14]), to name only a few, make no such
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restrictions. Nevertheless, there is a compelling presence of algebraic and geometric
structure in this limited context.
The results in [4] are built upon a novel use of the representation theory of the
symmetric group on the space of voting profiles. While this group action plays a
role here, our contribution is the emphasis and exploitation of a set of distinguished
‘results vectors’ vX which, by their inner products with profile vectors, completely
determine the outcome of an election using a positional voting method. Our more
elementary approach is to exploit the Euclidean geometry - and inner product -
of the vector space of profiles and of election outcomes. The geometry of this
interplay provides a novel and illuminating perspective from which we can examine
the behavior of linear voting methods.
As a proof-of-concept for our formalism, we provide a uniform proof that (almost)
all neutral linear social choice functions fail to satisfy the ubiquitous independence
of irrelevant alternatives criterion. This is a well-known result for all neutral social
choice functions (as a consequence of Arrow’s Theorem), but only for fully–ranked
ballots. Our results provide a restricted (only to linear functions) extension to
all partially ranked ballots. Also in the generality of partially ranked ballots, we
provide criteria for arbitrary neutral linear social choice functions to satisfy Pareto
efficiency and a suitably defined strong majority criterion.
There is undoubtedly much more to say than we have here. We are hopeful that
more representation–theoretic tools can be introduced in this framework, perhaps
to understand some more nuanced questions concerning insincere voting and the
potential for manipulation of voting methods. The role of the vectors vX>Y , and
their geometry, have some interesting combinatorial content. Further investigations
of these vectors will be addressed in a forthcoming publication.
2. Preliminary definitions and notation
We fix an integer n (the number of candidates), and let C = {C1, . . . , Cn} (the
enumerated list of candidates). Let Z+ (R+) be the set of nonnegative integers
(real numbers). For a positive integer r, we set [r] = {1, . . . , r}. In the following,
for any finite set S we denote by RS the vector space of functions from S to R; by
enumerating a basis, we obtain an isomorphism RS ∼= R|S|.
Let λ = (λ1, . . . , λm) be a composition of n. Henceforth, |λ| will denote the
number of elements λ1, . . . , λm of λ, and k will denote the multinomial coefficient
n!∏
λi!
. Let Cλ be the set of all tabloids of shape λ which are obtained by labeling
the corresponding Young diagram with the candidates C1, . . . , Cn. Alternatively Cλ
consists of all functions b : C→ [m] such that |b−1(i)| = λi. For a fixed candidate
X ∈ C, we define the evaluation map evX : Cλ → [m] by evX(b) = b(X).
Example. Let C = {A,B,C,D,E, F}, and λ = (2, 1, 3). Then |λ| = 3, and PλC is
spanned by R–linear combinations of tabloids of the form
b1 =
B D
A C F
E
, b2 =
A B
E F C
D
, . . .
We have evD(b1) = 1 and evD(b2) = 3, for example.
End of example.
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Let PC,λ = RCλ ∼=
⊕
b∈Cλ
Rb. We refer to an element of Cλ as a ballot and an
element of PC,λ as a profile. Any element p ∈ PC,λ is a map p : Cλ → R; the
scalar p(b) is the coefficient of b in p. For example, if C = {A,B,C,D,E, F} and
λ = (2, 3, 1), a typical profile looks like
0.7
A F
B C D
E
+ 5
B E
A F D
C
− 3
A F
B C D
E
.
We say a profile p is nonnegative if p(b) ≥ 0 for all ballots b. If p is nonnegative,
we should think of p as a pre-sorted ‘collection of ballots’, wherein the presence of
non-integer coordinates represents the notion that each voter can ‘split’ her vote
among the ballots. Our definition of a profile does not allow us to distinguish
ballots from individual voters; in fact these elements of PλC should be (and are
sometimes) called tabulated profiles. In this sense our profiles are anonymous, and
their definition restricts our study here to anonymous voting methods (those which
treat all candidates equally).
We identify Cλ with a basis of P
λ
C by associating to each b ∈ Cλ the delta
function δb, and we define an inner product on P
λ
C by
p · q =
∑
b∈Cλ
p(b)q(b).
We note that any ballot naturally provides a pairwise ranking of candidates:
the ballot b ‘ranks X over Y ’ if b(X) < b(Y ) (i.e., if X appears above Y in the
corresponding tabloid). If a ballot occurs with a negative coefficient (p(b) < 0),
we will postulate that this ballot provides pairwise rankings which are opposite to
b: if b (which we can naturally identify with the profile δb) ranks X over Y , then
−δb ranks Y over X - see The fundamental geometric relations in Section 4
below. However, we do not identify −δb with any nonnegative profile.
Let X,Y be two candidates in C, and let CX>Yλ = {b ∈ Cλ : b(X) < b(Y )}.
Note the alternate directions of the inequalities: the superscript of CX>Yλ reflects
the fact that X is preferred over (‘better than’) Y , but this is true for a ballot if the
ballot maps X to an integer less than Y (hence the condition b(X) < b(Y )). The
sets CX=Yλ , C
X<Y
λ are defined similarly. We define the subspace P
X>Y
C,λ of PC,λ as
PX>YC,λ = span
{
δb : b ∈ CX>Yλ
}
.
We note here that a profile in PX>YC,λ does not necessarily rank X over Y : negative
coefficients, which ‘reverse’ the preference ofX to Y , may be present. The subspaces
PY >XC,λ , P
X=Y
C,λ are defined similarly. Clearly we have a vector space direct sum
PC,λ = P
X>Y
C,λ ⊕ PX<YC,λ ⊕ PX=YC,λ , and we denote by piX>Y , piX<Y , and piX=Y the
corresponding projections onto these subspaces.
We define some distinguished vectors which will play a significant role in argu-
ments to follow. We let 1 :=
∑
b δb, the unit profile. For any two candidates X,Y ,
we define the profile vectors aX>Y and rX>Y as
aX>Y =
∑
b(X)<b(Y )
δb, and rX>Y = aX>Y − aY>X .
We collect a few basic properties of these vectors which follow directly from their
definitions:
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Proposition 2.1. Let X and Y be any candidates. Then
(1) rX>Y ⊥ 1.
(2) rX>Y = −rY>X.
(3) For any q ∈ R1, q · aX>Y = q · aY>X.
Example. Let λ = (2, 2). We can enumerate the elements of Cλ:
b1 b2 b3 b4 b5 b6
A B
C D
A C
B D
A D
B C
B C
A D
B D
A C
C D
A B
With this ordered basis, we have
rA>B = (0, 1, 1,−1,−1, 0), rA>C = (1, 0, 1,−1, 0,−1), . . .
For a profile p ∈ PλC and a ballot b ∈ Cλ, |p(b)| is the ‘number of people who
submitted the ballot b’. The height of a profile p is defined as ht(p) =
∑
b∈Cλ |p(b)|;
this integer counts the ‘number of voters submitting ballots’. The space of C–
orderings is the vector space RC, as each λ ∈ RC provides a weak ordering λ on
the set of candidates: for λ ∈ RC, X λ Y if and only if λ(X) ≤ λ(Y ).
A cardinal welfare function (CWF) is a map F : PλC → RC. By the above
comment, any CWF provides, for a profile p, a weak ordering of the candidates.
Our terminology is motivated by the standard terminology in the literature, where
a social choice function is traditionally a function on Z+–linear combinations of
C(1,...,1) which returns a subset of C (the ‘winners’ of the election), and a social
welfare function is a function on the same domain which returns a weak ordering
on C. The CWFs we define provide more than just a weak ordinal ranking; they
tell us how much one candidate is preferred over another. Any cardinal ranking
provides an ordinal ranking; hence, any CWF provides a social welfare function.
And any social welfare function provides a social choice function (simply by choosing
the ‘top–ranked’ candidates). We will refer to any of these functions as a voting
method.
Examples of various voting methods.
• Let λ = (1, . . . , 1). The function with domain ⊕b∈C Z+δb which selects
the candidate(s) with a plurality of first–place votes (the so-called plurality
method) is a social choice function (but is not a social welfare function).
• Let λ = (1, 1, . . . , 1), with |C| = n. Define a function F that awards points
to a candidate X as follows: for a ballot b,
F (δb)(X) =

n, b(X) = 1
n− 1, b(X) = 2
...
...
1, b(X) = n
Any Z+–linear combination of ballots p then awards a point total to each
candidate, calculated by summing over each ballot in p. The function with
domain
⊕
b∈C Z+δb which assigns to each candidate their corresponding
point total is a CWF. This is the well–known Borda Count method, used in
some real–world elections, including parliamentary elections of Nauru, and
the selections of the Heisman trophy winner and NFL MVP. The Borda
Count method is a CWF.
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• Let X ∈ C, and define F (p) = X for all p ∈ PλC. This constant function
at X is sometimes called monarchy. This is a social choice function.
• If a candidate has a majority of first–place votes, declare that candidate the
winner. Otherwise, remove from the ballots the candidate with the least
number of first place votes (preserving all remaining ordinal relations), and
look again for a majority candidate. Repeat this process until a majority
candidate is found (or the race ends in a tie between two candidates). This
is Hare’s Method. This is also a social choice function.
We refer the reader to [9] for more examples of voting methods.
Although we do not require CWFs to be linear, our focus here will be on those
that are. We will say F is trivial if, for all p ∈ PλC, F (p) ∈ R1 (the trivial CWFs
are just those which return an all–way tie for any profile). By the definitions given
for RC and PλC, any CWF treats all voters equally; i.e., it is an anonymous voting
method.
For v,w ∈ Rk, we will denote the angle between v and w by ∠(v,w). The
orthogonal complement of Rv is
Rv⊥ =
{
w ∈ Rk : v ·w = 0} ,
which we will denote by v⊥ for brevity. Let (v)+ =
{
w ∈ Rk : v ·w > 0}; this is
the positive half–space associated with v. Let (v)− = −(v)+. For any v ∈ Rk,
we have a disjoint union Rk = Rv+ ∪ Rv⊥ ∪ Rv−. These half–spaces will play a
prominent role in our description and analysis of voting criteria. We state several
elementary but relevant properties here:
Proposition 2.2. Let V be a vector space, and v,w ∈ V . The following are
equivalent:
(1) v ‖ w
(2) (v)+ = ±(w)+
(3) (v)+ ⊆ ±(w)+
Proof. Let v ∈ V and v = v1 + v2 be a decomposition of v into two orthogonal
components (so that v1 ·v2 = 0). If v1 6= 0, then v ·v1 = (v1 +v2) ·v1 = |v1|2 > 0,
and similarly for v2.
The proofs of (1) ⇒ (2) and (2) ⇒ (3) are immediate. To prove (3) ⇒ (1),
assume (3) and suppose v ∦ w. Let v = v1 + v2 be the decomposition of v onto
Rw and w⊥, respectively, so that 0 6= v2 ∈ w⊥. Then, since v2 · v > 0, by (3) we
must have v2 ·w 6= 0, a contradiction. 
A very minor modification of the proof shows, of course, that
v ∈ R>0w ⇔ (v)+ ⊆ (w)+ ⇔ (v)+ = (w)+.
3. Group actions
If X is a set, we denote by Aut(X) the collection of bijections X → X which
preserve some structure of X. In particular, if X is a finite set with no additional
structure, Aut(X) is the group of all bijections of X. If X is a vector space, Aut(X)
is the group of all invertible linear maps on X. An action of a group G on X is a
group homomorphism G→ Aut(X). If X is a vector space, this provides us with a
representation of G. There are two group actions we will use. In all cases, we will
denote by g.x the action of a group element g acting on x. For an element x ∈ X,
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we let Gx = {g ∈ G : g.x = x} (the isotropy subgroup of x in G). If X is a vector
space, a subspace W of X is invariant under G if g.W ⊆W for all g ∈ G.
Permutation of candidates. Let SC be the symmetric group on the set C of candi-
dates. Then SC acts naturally on Cλ by τ.b = b ◦ τ , hence on Pλ,C, and also on
RC.
Example. Let λ = (2, 2), and enumerate the elements of Cλ as in the example
above:
b1 b2 b3 b4 b5 b6
A B
C D
A C
B D
A D
B C
B C
A D
B D
A C
C D
A B
Let τ = (A B) ∈ SC. Then τ acts as follows: on Cλ,
τ(b1) = b1, τ(b2) = b4, τ(b3) = b5, τ(b6) = b6.
On PλC, with respect to the above fixed basis, τ acts via matrix multiplication by
1 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 1 0 0
0 0 0 0 1 0
0 1 0 0 0 0
0 0 1 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 1
 .
Rotations of the profile space. The special orthogonal group SO(k) is the group of
all orientation–preserving isometries of Rk. It can be identified with collection of
k-square matrices A satisfying ATA = I = AAT and det(A) = 1. The geometric
properties of SO(k) are well-known; see [6] or [12], for example. As k = dim
(
PλC
)
,
SO(k) acts (as ‘generalized rotations’, see below) on PλC. This action will be ex-
ploited in Section 5. We collect several important properties of the action of SO(k)
on Rk in the following proposition.
Proposition 3.1.
(1) Action by SO(k) preserves the Euclidean norm, inner product, and angle
between vectors in PλC.
(2) Suppose G is a subgroup of SO(k), and V is a subspace of Rk. Then V
is G–invariant if and only if V ⊥ is G–invariant. In particular, Rv is a
G–invariant subspace of PλC if and only if Rv⊥ is a G–invariant subspace.
(3) Let T ∈ SO(k). If T ((v)+) ⊆ (v)+, then T (v) = v.
(4) If r ∈ Rk, r 6= 0, the only fixed points of the isotropy subgroup SO(k)r
are the scalar multiples of r. For T ∈ SO(k)r and v ∈ Rk, ∠(v, r) =
∠(T (v), r).
Proof. (1) is well-known. We prove (2), (3) and (4). For (2), suppose that V is
G–invariant, and let v ∈ V . Let T ∈ G. Then T−1 ∈ G, and for any w ∈ V ⊥, we
have
0 = v ·w = (T−1.v) ·w = v · (T.w) .
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Hence, V ⊥ is G–invariant. The opposite direction now follows from the equality
V =
(
V ⊥
)⊥
.
To prove (3), we first claim that (T.v)+ ⊆ T (v+). Indeed, if u ∈ (T.v)+, we
have (
T−1.u
) · v = u · (T.v) > 0;
hence, u ∈ T (v+). Therefore (T.v)+ ⊆ (v)+, and by Proposition 2.2, we have
T.v = cv for some c > 0. Since T is an isometry, we must have c = 1.
To prove (4), we can rotate r so that r = (0, . . . , 0, 1), and identify SO(k)r with
the subgroup of matrices [
A˜ 0
0 1
]
,
where A˜ is an element of SO(k − 1). Indeed, any such matrix is an element of
SO(k) and fixes r. Conversely if A(r) = r then we can write T in the form above
for some (k−1)–square matrix A˜, and A ∈ SO(k) guarantees that A˜T A˜ = 1 = A˜A˜T ,
det(A˜) = 1. Then the first statement in (4) follows from the fact that SO(k − 1)
has no fixed points in Rk−1 (see [5] for details) . For the second statement, it is
sufficient to show that v · r = T (v) · r, which follows because r is a fixed point of T :
T (v) · r = T (v) · T (r) = v · r.

Because of the properties listed in (4), we call SO(k)r the rotation subgroup of
SO(k) with axis Rr. The action of an element g ∈ SO(k)r on Rk can be thought
of as a rotation about (the axis determined by) r.
4. Positional voting
We define a family of CWFs, the positional voting methods, as follows. Let
W = R[m] ∼= Rm, and w ∈ W . For any candidate X ∈ C, we define the X–
positional vector vw,X := w ◦ evX , which is an element of PλC. Henceforth the
weight vector w will usually be fixed and so we will write vX = vw,X for notational
convenience unless otherwise necessary.
The w–positional CWF Bλw is defined as follows: for p ∈ PλC,
Bλw(p) : X 7→ p · vX .
We note that Bλw is linear in both p and in w, and that for any w ∈ R1, Bλw is a
trivial CWF.
Example. Let C = {A,B,C}, λ = (1, 1, 1). Then
Cλ =
 AB
C
,
A
C
B
,
C
A
B
,
B
A
C
,
B
C
A
,
C
B
A
 .
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The first ballot
A
B
C
, for example, is the function which maps A to 1, B to 2,
and C to 3. We fix an ordering b1, . . . ,b6 of Cλ given by the ordering in the set
above. This gives us an ordered basis of PC,λ; denote by ρ : P
λ
C → R6 the corre-
sponding isomorphism. Let w = (3, 2, 1). Then vw,A = (3, 3, 2, 2, 1, 1). Similarly
we find vw,B = (2, 1, 1, 3, 3, 2), and vw,C = (1, 2, 3, 1, 2, 3). In this case the matrix
representation Tw of B
λ
w is
Tw =
 | | |vw,A vw,B vw,C
| | |
 =

3 2 1
3 1 2
2 1 3
2 3 1
1 3 2
1 2 3
 .
Let p be a profile given by
p =
6∑
i=1
ribi.
Then pw(A) = ρ(p) · (3, 3, 2, 2, 1, 1) = 3r1 + 3r2 + 2r3 + 2r4 + r5 + r6.
End of example.
Let vX>Y = vX − vY . With respect to a profile p and the positional method
Bλw, a candidate X defeats a candidate Y if and only if B
λ
w(p)(X) > B
λ
w(p)(Y ).
But this inequality is equivalent to p · vX > p · vY , or p ∈ (vX>Y )+. A significant
portion of our geometric perspective is based upon the following relations, one of
which we submit as a postulate and another that follows easily from the definitions.
The fundamental geometric relations. Fix a positional voting method Bλw
and let p be a profile.
Postulate 1. In the profile p, a candidate X defeats a candidate Y in a head–to–
head race if and only if p ∈ (rX>Y )+.
Proposition 1. In the profile p, the CWF Bλw awards a candidate X more points
than a candidate Y if and only if p ∈ (vX>Y )+.
Note that the vectors rX>Y are determined by λ, and are a built-in ‘feature’ of the
profile space PλC. The vectors vX>Y , however, are determined by the weight vector
w. The moral of the fundamental geometric relations is this: between candidates
X and Y , to determine who defeats whom in a head-to-head race, or to determine
who ‘wins’ with a profile p and a positional voting method Bλw, we don’t actually
need to count votes or calculate the positional point totals for X and Y ; we just
need to find the angles ∠(p, rX>Y ) or ∠(p,vX>Y ), respectively. Candidate X is
victorious over Y (in either sense) if and only if this angle is acute; i.e., if and only
if p lies in the positive half-space determined by rX>Y or vX>Y .
In the diagram below, a vector vX>Y is shown, along with its hyperplane v
⊥
X>Y .
Also shown are three profiles p1,p2,p3. In the outcome B
λ
w(p1), X defeats Y ; in
Bλw(p3), Y defeats X; and in B
λ
w(p2), X and Y tie.
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We collect a few geometric facts concerning the vectors vX>Y and rX>Y :
Proposition 4.1. Let X and Y be distinct candidates.
(1) 1 ⊥ vX>Y .
(2) Suppose |λ| = 2. Then vX>Y ‖ rX>Y .
(3) Suppose |λ| > 2. If vX>Y 6= 0, then vX>Y ∦ rX>Y .
Proof. To prove (1), note that since any transposition in SC permutes Cλ, we have∑
b∈Cλ
w(b(X)) =
∑
(XY )b∈Cλ
w(b(X)) =
∑
b∈Cλ
w(b(Y ));
hence, vX>Y ·1 =
∑
b∈Cλ w(b(X))−
∑
b∈Cλ w(b(Y )) = 0. To prove (2) and (3), first
suppose |λ| = 2. In this case, for two candidates X and Y and a ballot b we have
either b(X) = 1 and b(Y ) = 2, b(X) = 2 and b(Y ) = 1, or b(X) = b(Y ). Therefore
vX>Y (b) =

w(1)− w(2), b(X) < b(Y )
0, b(X) = b(Y )
w(2)− w(1), b(X) > b(Y ).
Therefore vX>Y = c rX>Y , where c = w(1)− w(2).
Next suppose |λ| > 2, and assume vX>Y ‖ rX>Y . This is equivalent to
vX>Y (b) =

c, b(X) < b(Y )
0, b(X) = b(Y )
−c, b(X) > b(Y )
for some c. This, in turn, gives us
w(i)− w(j) = c, for all 1 ≤ i < j ≤ m,
for which c = 0 is the only solution. 
These profiles {vX>Y }X,Y , and their orthogonality to 1, will be used in arguments
to follow.
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A CWF F : Pλ,C → RC is neutral if it is SC–equivariant; that is, if F ◦τ = τ ◦F
for all τ ∈ SC. Clearly any positional voting method is a neutral linear CWF.
Conversely, we gain no generality by considering arbitrary neutral linear CWFs:
Theorem 4.2. Any neutral linear CWF is a positional voting method.
Proof. Let F be a neutral CWF. For 1 ≤ j ≤ m, let NX,j = # {b ∈ Cλ : b(X) = j}
(the number of ballots which place X in jth place); then NX,j = NY,j for all
X,Y ∈ C. Define wX ∈ R[m] by
wX(j) =
1
NX,j
 ∑
b∈Cλ,b(X)=j
F (δb)(X)
 .
For any τ ∈ SXC , we have
F (δb)(X) = F ((τ
−1τ).δb)(X) = F (τ.δb)(τ.X) = F (τ.δb)(X).
If b′ is any other ballot such that b′(X) = b(X), we can find some τ ∈ SXC such
that τb = b′, and by the above comment we have F (δb)(X) = F (δb′)(X). Therefore
wX(j) = F (δb)(X), where b is any ballot satisfying b(X) = j.
Now let Y be any other candidate, let σ = (X Y ) ∈ SC, and 1 ≤ j ≤ m. Then
wY (j) = F (δb)(Y )
= F ((σ−1σ).δb)(Y )
= F (σ.δb)(X)
= F (δb′)(X)
= wX(j).
So we can define w = wX for any candidateX, and then w(b(X)) = F (δb)(X) for
any b ∈ Cλ andX ∈ C. Linearity of F then gives us F (p)(X) =
∑
p(b)(w ◦ evX)(b);
hence, F is the positional voting method with weight w. 
5. Results concerning voting criteria
There are certain criteria or ‘fairness standards’ one would hope any reasonable
voting method should satisfy. For an introductory discussion of these criteria, see
[9]. For example, if candidate X is ranked in first place for a majority of ballots, one
might expect X to be the unique winner of the election. This condition is called the
majority criterion. As compelling as it may seem, there are some prominent voting
methods, such as the Borda count, that do not satisfy this condition. A seminal
result of economist Kenneth Arrow, proven in 1950, demonstrates that no social
welfare function can satisfy three particular prominent and compelling criteria -
anonymity, Pareto efficiency, and independence of irrelevant alternatives. The first
of these criteria, anonymity, is simply the condition that a voting method should
not favor one member of the electorate over another. All positional voting methods
are, by design, anonymous, since the input data consists of a profile (which can be
thought of as a ballot collection that has already been tabulated). The remaining
two criteria (Pareto efficiency and independence of irrelevant alternatives), along
with several more, will be discussed below. An introductory discussion of these and
other voting criteria can be found in [9]. A comprehensive discussion of Arrow’s
Theorem, first published in [1], can be found in [8]. It is beyond our scope to discuss
this Theorem any further. Our more modest goal is to demonstrate the efficacy
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of the present framework to prove some useful facts concerning cardinal welfare
functions and some voting criteria.
5.1. Independence of irrelevant alternatives. Let X and Y be two candidates
in an election with three or more candidates, and let F be a CWF applied to
a profile p. Now suppose the voters are provided the opportunity of a ‘revote’
to submit another ballot q (perhaps some incriminating information was revealed
about a candidate), except that no voter changed her mind with respect to the
ordinal ranking of X and Y ; that is, if a voter ranked X above Y for p, she did
the same for q, and vice versa. For example, two voters may have voted, and then
revoted, as follows:
Y B
D X C
A
revote //
Y A
B C D
X
B D
C X Y
A
revote //
X Y
A B D
C
If we assume the individual ordinal preferences of X and Y remain unchanged
for all ballots in the revote p→ q, we might expect a reasonable CWF to follow suit
and leave the ordinal ranking of X and Y unchanged when evaluated at p and q
(F (p)(X) < F (p)(Y ) if and only if F (q)(X) < F (q)(Y ), and F (p)(X) = F (p)(Y )
if and only if F (q)(X) = F (q)(Y )). In the example given directly above, the
candidates A, B, C, and D are irrelevant to the ordinal ranking of X and Y . This
expectation (stated precisely below) is therefore usually known as the criterion
of independence of irrelevant alternatives (henceforth abbreviated as IIA). The
criterion requires that the aggregate ordinal ranking of two candidates X,Y remains
invariant under any change in profile for which the individual ordinal rankings
of X and Y remain the same, although the definitions found in the literature
vary depending on context and application. For example, the authors of [9], when
discussing social choice functions on fully ranked (λ = (1, · · · , 1)) profiles, define
IIA as follows (although some terminology and notation has been adapted to match
our own here):
Suppose X and Y are two candidates, and p, q are two profiles such
that no voter changes their preference with respect to X and Y (so
if X is preferred to Y for some ballot in p, then X is preferred to
Y for the ‘revised’ ballot in q, and vice versa). If X but not Y is
declared a winner when F is evaluated at p, then Y should not be
declared a winner when F is evaluated at q.
The definition found in [8], where ballots are still fully ranked, but social welfare
functions are considered, is more general. Here the author states that a social wel-
fare function F satisfies IIA if the following conditions holds:
Let X and Y be two candidates. Suppose p1 and p2 are any two
profiles where each voter’s {X Y } ranking in p1 agrees with the
voter’s {X Y } ranking in p2. Then the group’s {X Y } ranking for
F (p1) and F (p2) agree.
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We will recast this criterion in the current framework. Our definition of the
criterion will not require each voter to preserve their ordinal ranking of X and Y ;
indeed, as our profiles are already tabulated, we are prevented from even formulat-
ing such a condition. Instead, we will impose the weaker implied condition that the
number of ballots ranking X above Y remains unchanged (and similarly for ballots
ranking Y above X). There is no cost for this modification: all of our CWF’s are,
by design, anonymous, and so it can be shown that any CWF F will satisfy the
‘traditional’ IIA criterion if and only if it satisfies this weakened IIA criterion.
Of course, traditionally profiles are collections of ballots, and there is no notion
of a ‘negative vote’. So at first we define this equivalence only on nonnegative pro-
files. We will say that two nonnegative profiles p, q are X,Y –equivalent, written
p ∼X,Y q, if the number of ballots ranking X above Y in p is equal to the number
of ballots ranking X above Y in q, and similarly for ballots ranking Y above X. We
note that this notion of equivalence allows any voters with no preference between
X and Y to enter or leave the electorate. For example, we have
1
X
A B
Y C D
+ 4
A
C X
Y C D
+ 3
A
X Y
B C D
+ 7
A
Y B
X C D
∼X,Y 5
A
X B
Y C D
+ 15
A
B C
X Y D
+ 7
Y
A C
B D X
.
Now we recast this condition in terms of profile vectors.
Proposition 5.1. Two nonnegative profiles p, q are X,Y –equivalent if and only
if p− q is orthogonal to the plane spanned by aX>Y and aY>X.
Proof. Since p, q are nonnegative, the condition that p ∼X,Y q is that the number
of voters submitting ballots ranking X over Y remains unchanged, and similarly
for Y over X; i.e., we have
aX>Y · p = ht (piX>Y (p)) = ht (piX>Y (q)) = aX>Y · q,
and similarly for aY>X . 
We use this proposition to extend X,Y –equivalence to all profiles, by defining
p ∼X,Y q if p − q is orthogonal to spR {aX>Y ,aY>X}. For a profile p, we will
denote by [p]X,Y the equivalence class of all profiles q with q ∼X,Y p.
For a positional voting method Bλw, we now present our definition of the IIA
criterion. To motivate the definition, we clarify what we would desire: suppose,
after a profile p is submitted, a ‘revote’ q is provided. If the number of ballots
ranking X above Y remains unchanged in the revote, and similarly for Y above
X, we should hope that the aggregate ordinal ranking (under Bλw) for X and Y
remains unchanged. At the same time, the number of ballots ranking X and Y
equally should have no effect on this outcome. The requirement that Bλw preserves
the ordinal ranking on X and Y is equivalent to the condition
vX>Y · p > 0 ⇒ vX>Y · q > 0.
12
Therefore we present the following definition for the IIA criterion, adapted to ar-
bitrary compositions λ:
Definition 5.2. The positional voting method Bλw satisfies the IIA criterion if, for
any profiles p,q ∈ PλC with p ∼X,Y q,
p · vX>Y > 0 ⇒ q · vX>Y > 0.
The next lemma concerns rotations in PλC about rX>Y acting on the equivalence
classes [p]X,Y . Modulo the subspace R1, these equivalence classes are preserved by
rotations about rX>Y :
Lemma 5.3. If T is a rotation about rX>Y and p ∈ PλC, then there exists q ∈ R1
such that T (p) + q ∈ [p]X,Y .
Proof. Let p ∈ PλC and T be any rotation of p about rX>Y , and define
q =
(
(p− T (p)) · aX>Y
1 · aX>Y
)
1.
Then q · aX>Y = (p− T (p)) · aX>Y ; i.e., (T (p) + q) · aX>Y = p · aX>Y .
Since T preserves the inner product and T (rX>Y ) = rX>Y , we have p · rX>Y =
T (p) · T (rX>Y ) = T (p) · rX>Y ; hence, (T (p)− p) · aX>Y = (T (p)− p) · aY>X .
Therefore
q · aY>X = q · aX>Y ( Proposition 2.1 (3))
= (p− T (p)) · aX>Y
= (p− T (p)) · aY>X ,
and so (T (p) + q) · aY>X = p · aY>X . 
We are now prepared to restate the IIA criterion as a purely geometric one. Recall
that a rotation about a vector r ∈ Rk is an element of SO(k)r.
Proposition 5.4. The positional voting method Bλw satisfies IIA if and only if
SO(k)rX>Y preserves (vX>Y )+.
Proof. For convenience we abbreviate vX>Y = v, and similarly for rX>Y . We will
use the fact that v ⊥ 1 (Proposition 4.1). First assume Bλw satisfies IIA. Let
T ∈ SO(k)r, and assume p ·v > 0. Then by Lemma 5.3, T (p)+q ∼X,Y p for some
q ∈ R1; hence, T (p) · v = (T (p) + q) · v > 0.
Conversely, suppose rotation about r preserves (v)+. Then for any T ∈ SO(k)r
we have T (v)+ ⊆ (v)+. By Lemma 3.1 (3), we have T (v) = v. Since the only
fixed points of SO(k)r are elements of Rr (Lemma 3.1 (4)), we must have v = c r
for some scalar c. Now suppose p · v > 0. Then for any q ∈ [p]XY , we have
(p− q) · r = 0; hence, q · v = cq · r = cp · r = p · v > 0. 
Theorem 5.5. A nontrivial linear neutral CWF F on a profile space PλC satisfies
IIA if and only if |λ| = 2.
Proof. Let F be a nontrivial linear neutral CWF. By Theorem 4.2, F is a positional
voting method. Rotation about rX>Y preserves (vX>Y )+ if and only if vX>Y =
c rX>Y for some scalar c. If |λ| > 2, Proposition 4.1 guarantees vX>Y = 0; hence,
F is trivial. If |λ| = 2, Proposition 4.1 gives us vX>Y ‖ rX>Y , and by Proposition
5.4 F satisfies IIA. 
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Let a group G act upon PλC. We will say that a profile p ∈ PλC is IIA–unstable
with respect to G if there exists some g ∈ G such that p and g.p provide an IIA–
violation. The result above demonstrates that there exist profiles p which are
IIA–unstable with respect to the action of the special orthogonal group on PλC. Of
course, if p is IIA–unstable with respect to G and G is a subgroup of H, then p is
also IIA–unstable with respect to H. The converse, however, should be false, and
this motivates an interesting question - if p is IIA–unstable with respect to G and
G′ ≤ G, does (or when does) p remain IIA–unstable with respect to G′?
5.2. Pareto efficiency. Classically, a candidate X is preferred unanimously to
a candidate Y in a (nonnegative) profile p if X appears ‘above’ Y for all ballots
in p. The criterion of Pareto efficiency demands that X defeats Y in an election
whenever X is preferred unanimously to Y . To adapt the condition of unanimous
preference to an arbitrary profile in a manner consistent with Postulate 1, we will
say that a (nonzero) profile p prefers X unanimously to Y if
• p(b) ≥ 0 for any ballot b satisfying b(X) < b(Y ),
• p(b) ≤ 0 for any ballot b satisfying b(X) > b(Y ),
• the projection of p onto PX>YC,λ ⊕ PX<YC,λ is nonzero.
The collection of all profiles which prefer X unanimously to Y , which we will
denote
(
PλC
)
XY , is then
(
PλC
)
XY =
 ∑
b(X)<b(Y )
rbδb +
∑
b(X)>b(Y )
sbδb +
∑
b(X)=b(Y )
tbδb :
rb ≥ 0, sb ≤ 0,
∑
rb −
∑
sb > 0
}
.
If λ = (1, . . . , 1), then
(
PλC
)
XY is an orthant of P
λ
C.
Our adapted definition for Pareto efficiency is this: a CWF F is Pareto effi-
cient if, for any profile p which prefers X unanimously to Y , we have F (p)(X) >
F (p)(Y ). This equality holds if and only if p ·vX>Y > 0. So we see that F is Pareto
efficient if and only if
(
PλC
)
XY lies in the half–space (vX>Y )+.
Proposition 5.6. The positional voting method Bλw is Pareto efficient if and only
if w is strictly decreasing; i.e., w(i) > w(i+ 1).
Proof. First assume w is strictly decreasing. We must show that
(
PλC
)
XY ⊆
(vX>Y )+, for which it is necessary and sufficient to show the containment
{δb}b(X)<b(Y ) ∪ {−δb}b(X)>b(Y ) ⊆ (vX>Y )+ .
If b(X) < b(Y ), then
0 < w(b(X))−w(b(Y )) = δb · vX>Y . (5.1)
If b(X) > b(Y ), then
0 < w(b(Y ))−w(b(X)) = (−δb) · vX>Y . (5.2)
Conversely, if
(
PλC
)
XY ⊆ (vX>Y )+, we obtain the inequalities δb · vX>Y > 0 for
b(X) < b(Y ), from which w(i) > w(i+ 1) follows. 
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5.3. The strong majority criterion. The classical majority criterion is defined
as follows: suppose p is a nonnegative profile in PλC for λ = (1, . . . , 1). A majority
candidate is one who receives a majority of first–place votes. This candidate may
not exist, but if they do they are unique. A social choice function satisfies the
majority criterion if the majority candidate, when she exists, is the unique winner
of the election. There are some technical obstructions to adapting this definition to
the present framework, notably due to the existence of negative coefficients in an
arbitrary profile. Here we discuss a variation of this criterion, which can be applied
to arbitrary partitions and profiles.
Definition 5.7. A CWF F satisfies the strong majority criterion if, whenever a
candidate X defeats a candidate Y in a head–to–head race in a profile p, we have
F (p)(X) > F (p)(Y ); i.e., X defeats Y in the election.
For nonnegative profiles, the strong majority criterion clearly implies the classical
majority criterion.
By Theorem 4.2, any CWF F is a positional voting method Bλw. Therefore we
can recast the above definition as follows. Note that candidate X defeats candidate
Y in a head–to–head race if and only if p·rX>Y > 0, and X defeats Y in the election
if and only if p · vX>Y > 0. So we have the following geometric characterization:
Proposition 5.8. The positional voting method Bλw satisfies the strong majority
criterion if and only if (rX>Y )+ ⊆ (vX>Y )+.
For |λ| > 2, this criterion is - like IIA - a terrible one, because it is too strong - it
is never satisfied. Of interest is not the result in itself, perhaps, but the geometric
characterization and proof.
Theorem 5.9. If |λ| = 2, then the positional voting method Bλw satisfies the strong
majority criterion if and only if w(1) > w(2). If |λ| > 2 then no nontrivial posi-
tional voting method satisfies strong majority.
Proof. First assume |λ| = 2. In this case, the vectors rX>Y and vX>Y are parallel
- in fact, vX>Y = (w(1) − w(2))rX>Y (see proof of Proposition 4.1). If w(1) >
w(2), then vX>Y = crX>Y for c > 0; hence, (rX>Y )+ = (vX>Y )+, and Proposition
5.6 guarantees that Bλw is Pareto efficient. Conversely, if B
λ
w is Pareto efficient,
Proposition 5.6 guarantees that w(1)−w(2) > 0.
Next assume |λ| > 2, and assume F is a nontrivial CWF. By Theorem 4.2, F
is a positional voting method. By Proposition 2.2, (rX>Y )+ ⊆ (vX>Y )+ only if
rX>Y ‖ vX>Y . By Proposition 4.1, this can only happen if vX>Y = 0, which yields
the trivial CWF. 
By Theorem 4.2, all CWF’s with |λ| > 2 violate the strong majority criterion.
5.4. The Condorcet criterion. A candidate X ∈ C is a Condorcet candidate in
a profile if, given any other candidate Y ∈ C, X defeats Y in a head–to–head race.
A social choice function F satisfies the Condorcet criterion if the Condorcet candi-
date is guaranteed (unique) victory. Although we don’t have a characterization of
all neutral linear CWFs that satisfy the Condorcet criterion, we do provide an in-
teresting geometric characterization of this condition. Before stating the condition,
we need a lemma.
Lemma 5.10. Let F be a neutral linear CWF, and let uX>Y = F (rX>Y ). Then
F (p)(X) > F (p)(Y ) if and only if F (p) · uX>Y > 0.
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Proof. By Theorem 4.2, F = Bλw for some w ∈ RC. To prove the result, it is
sufficient to show there exists some c ∈ R+ such that
uX>Y (Z) =

c, Z = X
−c, Z = Y
0, otherwise.
For Z ∈ C, we have
uX>Y (Z) = F (rX>Y )(Z) = B
λ
w(rX>Y )(Z)
= rX>Y · vZ
=
∑
b∈Cλ
rX>Y (b)(w ◦ evZ)(b)
=
∑
b∈CX>Yλ
w(b(Z))−
∑
b∈CX<Yλ
w(b(Z)).
If Z 6= X,Y , then uX>Y (Z) = 0, and clearly we have uX>Y (X) = −uX>Y (Y ). So
it only remains to show that uX>Y (X) > 0. For i, j ∈ [m], define CX=i,Y=jλ = {b ∈
Cλ | b(X) = i, b(Y ) = j}. In other words, CX=i,Y=jλ is the set of all ballots that have
X ranked in level i and Y ranked in level j. Note that
∣∣∣CX=i,Y=jλ ∣∣∣ = ∣∣∣CX=j,Y=iλ ∣∣∣
for all i, j. Now, we may write
uX>Y (X) =
m−1∑
i=1
m∑
j=i+1
(∣∣∣CX=i,Y=jλ ∣∣∣w(i)− ∣∣∣CX=j,Y=iλ ∣∣∣w(j))
=
m−1∑
i=1
m∑
j=i+1
∣∣∣CX=i,Y=jλ ∣∣∣ (w(i)−w(j)) .

A candidate X is a Condorcet candidate in a profile p if and only if, for any
Y 6= X, p · rX>Y > 0 (Postulate 1). If Y 6= Z, we have rX>Z = (Y Z).rX>Y .
Therefore we can write
p · rX>Z = p · (Y Z).rX>Y = (Y Z).p · rX>Y ,
and we see that the original condition p · rX>Y > 0 for all Y 6= X is equivalent to
SXC .p ⊆ (rX>Y )+. The candidate X is the unique winner if and only if F (p)·uX>Y >
0 for all Y 6= X, where uX>Y was introduced in Lemma 5.10 above; this condition
is equivalent to SXC .F (p) ⊆ (uX>Y )+. Since F is SC–equivariant, this is equivalent
to F (SXC .p) ⊆ (uX>Y )+. If F is realized as a positional voting method Bλw, we
can alternatively state this ‘unique winning’ condition as SXC .p ⊆ (vX>Y )+. We
summarize these observations in the following proposition.
Proposition 5.11. A candidate X is a Condorcet candidate in the profile p if
and only if, given any other candidate Y ∈ C, the SXC –orbit of p is contained in
(rX>Y )+. The CWF F satisfies the Condorcet criterion if and only if
SXC .p ⊆ (rX>Y )+ ⇒ F (SXC .p) ⊆ (F (rX>Y ))+. (5.3)
If F is realized as a positional voting method Bλw, then this condition is equivalent
to
SXC .p ⊆ (rX>Y )+ ⇒ SXC .p ⊆ (vX>Y )+.
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6. Equivalent positional voting methods
In this section we describe classes of all CWFs that are ‘essentially the same’.
Although some of these results were previously given in [4], we offer an alternate
proof of this classification. We present two equivalences on the collection of CWFs:
order–equivalence and cardinal–equivalence.
We say that two CWFs F,G are order–equivalent, written F ∼o G, if, for any
profile p and any candidates X,Y , F (p)(X) > F (p)(Y ) if and only if G(p)(X) >
G(p)(Y ). This means that for any profile, F and G will always return the same
ordinal ranking of candidates (even if the numerical scores may differ). We extend
this equivalence relation to R[m]: we say two vectors u, w are order-equivalent,
written u ∼o w, if Bu ∼o Bw. It is easily verified that ∼o is an equivalence
relation.
We next define cardinal–equivalence. The rationale behind this equivalence is
the following: suppose C = {X,Y, Z}, and CWFs F and G satisfy, for some profile
p,
F (p) = (4, 1, 2), G(p) = (8, 2, 4).
These two outcomes are ‘essentially the same’ for the three candidates, in the sense
that the ratios of points awarded are the same in each case (X earns four times
as many points as Y , and twice as many points as Z). In this sense we should
not distinguish between F and αF , if α is any positive scalar. Consider now the
outcomes
F (p) = (4, 1, 2), G′(p) = (10, 4, 6) = G(p) + (2, 2, 2).
In this case F and G′ are proportional up to addition of a scalar multiple of 1 (in
this case (2, 2, 2)). As addition of any such vector should not affect the outcome
of an election, we should not distinguish G from G′. So we say that F and G are
cardinal–equivalent, written F ∼c G, if there exist α ∈ R>0, r ∈ R such that, for
any profile p, F (p) = α(G(p) + r1). We similarly extend the notion of cardinal–
equivalence to R[m], and we denote by [w]c the equivalence class of w with respect
to ∼c. Clearly cardinal–equivalence implies order–equivalence.
Lemma 6.1. Let X and Y be distinct candidates. Let TX>Y : R[m] → PλC be
the linear map given by TX>Y : w 7→ vw,X>Y . Then the kernel of TX>Y is the
1–dimensional subspace spanned by 1 ∈ R[m].
Proof. An easy calculation shows 1 ∈ ker(TX>Y ). For the opposite containment,
recall that we may write vX as
vX =
∑
b∈Cλ
w(b(X))δb.
Then we have
TX>Y (w) =
∑
b∈Cλ
(w(b(X))−w(b(Y )))δb.
For any b ∈ Cλ, this gives TX>Y (w)(b) = w(b(X)) − w(b(Y )). Suppose that
w ∈ ker(TX>Y ), let i, j ∈ [m], and let b ∈ CX=i,Y=jλ . Then 0 = TX>Y (w)(b) =
w(i)−w(j); hence, w(i) = w(j).

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The first part of the next proposition shows that, up to order–equivalence, we
can always assume that the weight vector w is orthogonal to 1 in R[m]. The second
part describes the order–equivalence class of w ∈ R[m].
Proposition 6.2. Let w ∈ R[m].
(1) The order–equivalence class of w always contains an element w′ ∈ 1⊥.
(2) Let w ∈ 1⊥. The order–equivalence class of w is the positive half–plane
(w)+ of R1⊕ Rw.
Proof. Bλu ∼o Bλw if and only if, for any profile p and any candidates X,Y ,
p · vu,X>Y > 0 ⇔ p · vw,X>Y > 0.
This is true if and only if vu,X>Y = αvw,X>Y for some α > 0. This, in turn, is true
if and only if u− αw is in the kernel of TX>Y ; i.e., u− αw ∈ R1 (by Lemma 6.1).
Therefore the positional voting methods Bλu and B
λ
w are order–equivalent if and
only if u ∈ R>0w ⊕ R1. 
The weight vectors w and −w are certainly not order–equivalent: clearly −w
fully reverses the order corresponding to w. For this reason, we will refer to Bλw and
−Bλw = Bλ−w as an antipodal pair. The Proposition states that the plane R1⊕ Rw
contains the order–equivalence classes for w and −w (and all such planes contain
the order–equivalence class for the trivial voting method).
Corollary 6.3.
(1) Up to order–equivalence, the collection of all antipodal pairs ±F of linear
CWFs on PλC is parametrized by the projective space RPm−2.
(2) Two linear CWFs are order–equivalent if and only if they are cardinal–
equivalent.
Proof. The collection of order–equivalence classes in R[m] for ±Bλw consists of the
family of all planes which contain (hence intersect at) the subspace R1. We note
that this is also the Grassmannian G(1,m− 1).
Let F = Bλu and G = B
λ
w. If B
λ
u ∼c Bλw, then clearly Bu ∼o Bλw. Conversely,
suppose Bu ∼o Bλw. Then by the Proposition 6.2 we have w = αu+β1. By linearity
of Bλw (in w) we have B
λ
w = Bαu+β1 = αB
λ
u + βB
λ
1 ; hence, B
λ
w ∼c Bλu. 
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The diagram below illustrates the unit vector 1, along with the half-planes of equiv-
alence classes corresponding to a collection of nonequivalent weight vectors (these
weight vectors are not shown in the image). Each half-plane, arranged as a page
along the spine of R1, corresponds to exactly one equivalence class of CWF’s.
As mentioned above, the result in Proposition 6.2 (2) was given in [4]. However,
the equivalence of order– and cardinal–equivalence was not mentioned there. The
identification of antipodal pairs of CWFs with a projective space is an easy corol-
lary, but it seems worth mentioning; on a speculative note it may be interesting
to use this identification to provide the collection of all CWFs with this natural
topology for future applications.
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